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IN RE ALLERS: A DISPLAY OF PROGRESS, NOT 
PERFECTION, IN THE GUARDIANSHIP SYSTEM 
Melanie Rosen

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Article 81 of New York’s Mental Hygiene Law was created 
with the intention of promoting the welfare of an incapacitated person 
by establishing a system for the appointment of a guardian.1  The law 
applies to proceedings for appointing a guardian for personal or prop-
erty management needs.2  The significance of this provision has been 
amplified in recent years.3  Several demographic trends have enabled 
researchers to predict an increased number of guardianship appoint-
ments in the coming years.4  In 2003, 35.9 million people in the Unit-
ed States were of ages sixty-five and older.5  By 2030, with the Baby 
Boomers coming of age, that number is expected to double.6  Addi-
tionally, the number of people aged eighty-five and older is expected 
to grow from 4.7 to 9.6 million by 2030.
7
  Alzheimer’s disease and 
dementia cases have also become far more prevalent, doubling since 
1980.8  As a consequence, reliance by Allegedly Incapacitated Per-
sons (“AIPs”) and their families, counsel, and the courts upon Article 
81 and its body of law will become even more frequent in the near fu-
 
 J.D Candidate 2014, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; Binghamton Univer-
sity. Special thanks to Professor Tracy McGaugh Norton for graciously contributing her time 
and knowledge, and most importantly to my family and friends for their unfettered love, 
support, and belief in me. 
1 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 2013). 
2 Id. 
3 Naomi Karp & Erica F. Wood, Guardianship Monitoring: A National Survey of Court 
Practices, 37 STETSON L. REV. 143, 149 (2007) (referring to guardianship as an important 
tool in today’s society nationwide). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Karp & Wood, supra note 3, at 149-50. 
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ture.9  
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,10 
which has been inconsistently applied to Guardianship Proceedings, 
is replicated in the New York State Constitution.11  The purpose of 
the Fifth Amendment is to safeguard several individual civil liberties 
and, more specifically, to protect against self-incrimination.12  Alt-
hough this privilege originally extended only to criminal proceedings, 
its interpretation has evolved13 and was recently applied in a civil 
Guardianship Proceeding.
14
 
In In re Allers,15 the Supreme Court of Dutchess County de-
termined that a temporary guardian needed to be appointed for the 
AIP, G.P.16  On July 19, 2012, the court found that G.P. required as-
sistance with his property management needs, but found that ap-
pointment of a personal needs guardian was unwarranted.17  G.P. at-
tended the hearing with his court-appointed attorney, where the 
opposing counsel representing the Department of Social Services 
(“DSS”) attempted to call G.P. to the stand to testify as a witness to 
the proceeding.18  G.P.’s attorney objected, and the court sustained 
the objection.19  On July 26, 2012, the New York Supreme Court of 
Dutchess County, declining to follow a pair of appellate court deci-
sions, held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination did, in fact, protect AIPs from being compelled to testi-
fy at their Guardianship Proceedings.20 
AIPs in civil Guardianship Proceedings are just as vulnerable 
as others who are protected by the right against self-incrimination, 
 
9 Jan Ellen Rein, Ethics and the Questionably Competent Client: What the Model Rules 
Say and Don’t Say, 9 STAN. L. & POL. REV. 241 (1998). 
10 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
11 Michael Prisco, Note, Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division, Fourth Depart-
ment In Re Heckl, 25 TOURO L. REV. 1327, 1340 (2009). 
12 Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
13 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967) (upholding a juvenile’s right against self-
incrimination in a non-criminal proceeding). 
14 See In re Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d 902, 906 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. 2012) (holding that an 
AIP can invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination). 
15 Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d 902. 
16 Id. at 903.  Throughout the article, as is common in guardianship proceedings, aliases 
given to the parties by the court will be utilized.  Frequently, these aliases consist of the par-
ties’ names reduced to an acronym. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 906. 
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such as criminal defendants, because they can demonstrate a depriva-
tion of liberty.21  Not only is an AIP vulnerable to coercion because 
of his or her particular mental or physical incapacity, but there is a 
greater risk that he or she might lose certain individual freedoms.22  
This Comment will explore the recent decision of Allers as it relates 
to the Fifth Amendment and Guardianship Proceedings, and how Ar-
ticle 81 of the New York State Mental Hygiene Law is a well-needed 
step forward in the protection of AIPs and their constitutionally pro-
tected right against self-incrimination. 
II. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND AIPS 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified in 
1791,23 and was replicated in the New York Constitution.24  At first, 
the Fifth Amendment only applied to actions by the federal govern-
ment, but the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment extended the-
se individual protections to the States.25  The Fifth Amendment was 
enacted to safeguard the people from majoritarian impulses, and it 
provides five distinct liberties: (1) the right to be indicted by an im-
partial Grand Jury before being tried for a federal criminal offense, 
(2) the right to be free from multiple prosecutions or punishments for 
a single criminal offense, (3) the right to remain silent when prose-
cuted for a criminal offense, (4) the right to have personal liberties 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and (5) the right to receive just compensation when the government 
takes private property for public use.26 
Designed to promote the public’s well-being, the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination protects individuals from 
making inculpatory statements.27  This right was developed in reac-
tion to certain historical practices, which compelled criminal defend-
 
21 In re United Health Servs. Hosps., Inc., 785 N.Y.S.2d 313, 317 (Sup. Ct. Broome Cty. 
2004). 
22 Id. 
23 See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE 
L.J. 408 (2010) (discussing “the textual and historical evidence regarding the original mean-
ings of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment[s]”). 
24 Prisco, supra note 11, at 1340. 
25 United Health Servs. Hosps., Inc., 785 N.Y.S.2d at 313-14; see Gault, 387 U.S. at 49. 
26 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
27 7 CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 42:141. 
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ants to “admit guilt from their own lips.”28  The right against self-
incrimination is broadly interpreted to assure that an individual is not 
compelled to provide evidence that may be used against him or her.29  
The components of the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination are: “(1) the right of a witness not to incriminate him-
self; (2) the right of a defendant in a criminal trial not to take the wit-
ness stand at all; and (3) the right of such a defendant not to have his 
failure to take the stand commented upon.”30 
The right against compelled self-incrimination is ordinarily 
not a self-executing device; it must be claimed. As such, citizens 
seeking its protection must assert their Fifth Amendment right in a 
timely fashion.31  Of the very few exceptions to this generally self-
executing device, one is the Miranda right to remain silent.32  Anoth-
er limited exception applies when “an individual is subjected to a 
practice that denies him a free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to 
answer, then . . . an individual does not need to invoke the privilege 
against self-incrimination in order to have his admissions suppressed 
in an ensuing criminal prosecution.”33  In determining whether a per-
son’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination has been vio-
lated, the Court considers the significance of the testimony and 
weighs it against the prejudice to the party.34 
Originally, the right against self-incrimination did not attach 
in all instances.35  The text of the Fifth Amendment limited the right 
 
28 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974); see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 
463, 470 (1976) (stating “the development of this protection was in part a response to certain 
historical practices, such as ecclesiastical inquisitions and the proceedings of the Star Cham-
ber, ‘which placed a premium on compelling subjects of the investigation to admit guilt from 
their own lips.’ ”). 
29 Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461 (1975). 
30 United States ex rel. Miller v. Follette, 278 F. Supp. 1003, 1007 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 
397 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1968). 
31 United States v. D.F., 857 F. Supp. 1311, 1323 (E.D. Wis. 1994); see Roberts v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 552, 559 (1980); see also Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976) 
(stating that once an individual “discloses the information sought, any incriminations. . .are 
viewed as not compelled,” and the privilege is no longer available). 
32 Roberts, 445 U.S. at 560. 
33 United States v. Saechao, 418 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “the proba-
tioner’s answers to incriminating questions posed by his probation officer are deemed com-
pelled and are inadmissible in ensuing criminal proceedings”) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted); Id. at 1081. 
34 United States v. Humphrey, 696 F.2d 72, 75 (8th Cir. 1982); see United States v. Gould, 
536 F.2d 216, 222 (8th Cir. 1976). 
35 Ryan v. C. I. R., 568 F.2d 531, 541-42 (7th Cir. 1977); see Gault, 387 U.S. at 49 (stat-
ing that juvenile proceedings are technically “civil” and do not fall within the original, ex-
4
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against self-incrimination to criminal proceedings.36  There has been 
great controversy amongst judges regarding how the Fifth Amend-
ment should be interpreted, and the Supreme Court has attempted, on 
several occasions and in various situations, to determine exactly what 
falls within the protections of the Fifth Amendment.37  However, to-
day, in the State of New York, the constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination has been applied in non-criminal proceedings re-
garding juveniles,38 as well as in family court proceedings.39  Interest-
ingly, only recently have the courts in New York protected an AIP’s 
right against self-incrimination in Guardianship Proceedings.40 
III. IN RE ALLERS 
On July 13, 2012, the court gathered to determine whether 
G.P. was going to be appointed a temporary guardian for his personal 
care and property management needs.41  G.P. did not consent to the 
appointment of a guardian.42  The Commissioner of Social Services 
of Dutchess County (“DSS”) called G.P. to the stand to testify as a 
witness, but G.P.’s attorney objected, and ultimately, the court sus-
tained the objection.43  On July 19, 2012, although the application for 
a personal care guardian was denied, a temporary guardian for G.P.’s 
property needs was appointed.44 
On July 26, 2012, a hearing was held to determine whether 
G.P.’s temporary guardian should be made into a permanent guardi-
an.45  Prior to the hearing, DSS submitted a letter stating that G.P. 
should have previously been required to testify and requested that he 
 
plicit meaning proscribed by the Fifth Amendment). 
36 Ryan, 568 F.2d at 541-42.  
37 See Gault, 387 U.S. at 49 (stating that “the availability of the privilege does not turn 
upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked . . . .  [F]or example, [it can] 
be claimed in a civil or administrative proceeding, if the statement is or may be 
inculpatory”). 
38 In re White, 334 N.Y.S.2d 476, 480 (Fam. Ct. Nassau Cty. 1972).  
39 In re Ashley, 683 N.Y.S.2d 304, 305 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1998); see Murphy v. Water-
front Comm’n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (stating “[t]he privilege can be 
claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or 
adjudicatory”). 
40 See Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d 902. 
41 Id. at 903. 
42 Id. at 904. 
43 Id. at 903. 
44 Id. 
45 Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 903. 
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be ordered to do so.46  DSS cited two Fourth Department, Appellate 
Division decisions, both of which held that an AIP could be com-
pelled to testify at his or her own guardianship hearing.47  The De-
partment of Social Services argued that, because no Second Depart-
ment decisions address the issue, the court should rely on those 
Fourth Department decisions.48 
The judge discussed the many protections that Article 81 pro-
vides, including the rights to proper notice, legal representation, the 
right to demand a jury trial, and the right to be present at, and partici-
pate in, any and all hearings.49  However, the judge also noted that 
Article 81 was “noticeably silent” on the issue of whether an AIP 
must testify at his or her own Guardianship Proceeding.50 
The court in Allers treated the letter as a motion in limine and 
denied the request.51  The court held it did not agree with the Fourth 
Department’s interpretation of the statute.52  Instead, on July 26, 
2012, the New York Supreme Court of Dutchess County held that the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination did, in fact, 
protect an AIP from being compelled to testify at his or her own 
Guardianship Proceeding.53  The judge held that the Fourth Depart-
ment decisions were wrong and unreliable for the present use because 
they relied on a now-outdated statute, Article 77.54  The judge noted 
that the new and improved Article 81 standard is much more difficult 
to satisfy because decisions must be based upon clear and convincing 
evidence, rather than merely best interests.55  The court went on to 
explain that the legislature intended to “heighten right[s] previously 
absent” when it implemented Article 81.56  The Judge determined that 
the decision in In re United Health Services Hospitals, Inc.
57
 was a 
more appropriate application of the rule, and that the AIP should not 
 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 904 (citing In re Heckl, 840 N.Y.S.2d 516 (4th Dep’t 2007)). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 904. 
51 Id. at 903. 
52 Id. at 906 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 905 (stating that Mental Hygiene Law Article 77 was in effect at the time of the 
previous decisions). 
55 Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 905. 
56 Id. 
   57  785 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. Broome Cty. 2004). 
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be compelled to testify at her hearing.58 
Aside from the court’s most recent decision regarding the 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Guardianship 
Proceedings, the court in Allers explained that Article 81 continues to 
be described as a statute “at war with itself,” “containing language 
suggesting that some decisions should be made in the best interest of 
the AIP,” and creating “contradictory notions of an adversarial model 
and a paternalistic model.”59  Some suggest that Guardianship Pro-
ceedings should be treated like traditional litigation, basing decisions 
upon the technicalities of the law in order for a party to prevail.
 60  
Others, on the contrary, believe Article 81 should be used as a guide-
line, which must meet the “best interest[s]” of the AIP, while placing 
little emphasis on the rules of evidence.61 
IV. ARTICLE 81 
A. History 
On April 1, 1993, Article 81 became effective and the former 
guardianship statutes, Articles 77 and 78, were repealed.62  A study 
by New York’s Law Revision Commission had revealed that Articles 
77 and 78 were failing to provide adequate protection to incapacitated 
persons.63  While Article 77 catered to the monetary and property 
needs of the incapacitated person, it did not address any personal 
needs.64  Article 78, on the other hand, authorized the appointment of 
a committee that would address these personal needs, but only if the 
court found that the AIP was totally incompetent.65 
Since “[a] finding of incompetence was a drastic measure, 
 
58 Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 905. 
59 Id. at 904 (quoting Daniel G. Fish, Does the Fifth Amendment Apply in Guardianship 
Proceedings?, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 25, 2011). 
60 Daniel G. Fish, Does the Fifth Amendment Apply in Guardianship Proceedings?, 
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 25, 2011. 
61 Id. 
62 Rosann Torres, Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law: Designed to Protect the Elderly, 
But Prejudicing Children's Rights, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 303, 309 (1998). 
63 Id. at 310. 
64 Id. at 309. 
65 Id. at 310; see EDWIN KASSOFF, ELDERLAW AND GUARDIANSHIP IN NEW YORK § 11:4 
(1996) (describing the inadequacies of Articles 77 and 78 stating “Article 78 went beyond 
financial matters, authorizing the appointment of a committee that could exercise control 
over the personal life of a person judged to be incompetent”). 
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which could deprive individuals of their civil rights,” the court was 
reluctant to employ Article 78.66  Consequently, the courts’ decisions 
often favored the use of Article 77, resulting in inadequate protection 
for the personal welfare of incapacitated persons.67  In an attempt to 
correct this inadequacy, the legislature enacted Article 81, which ad-
dressed simultaneously both the personal and property-related needs 
of AIPs.68  Article 81, the new and improved standard, did away with 
“the labels of incompetency and substantial impairment in Articles 77 
and 78 and their requirement of some underlying illness or condi-
tion.”69  Using a least restrictive means standard, Article 81 outlines 
the powers of guardians as fiduciaries to maintain the property and 
person of incapacitated persons.70 
B. Appointment of a Guardian 
Appointment of a guardian under Article 81 is based on clear 
and convincing evidence rather than the previous “best interests” 
standard.71  This is an improved attempt at affording AIPs heightened 
rights, which were previously absent.72  Article 81 entitles the AIP to 
“proper notice, legal representation, the right to demand a jury trial, 
the right to be present at any hearing, present evidence and otherwise 
participate.”73  Article 81 was enacted with the legislative purpose of 
addressing the “needs of persons with incapacities [which] are as di-
verse and complex as they are unique to the individual.”74  Although 
an appointed guardian is given authority to satisfy the needs of the 
incapacitated person, this power can only be exercised in cases where 
the court sees it absolutely necessary for the specific individual.75  By 
narrowing the power of the guardian’s authority, the AIP is able to 
maintain the “greatest amount of independence and self-
determination and participation in all the decisions” made.76 
 
66 Torres, supra note 62, at 310 (quoting KASSOFF, supra note 65). 
67 Id. at 310-11. 
68 Id. at 313. 
69 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02 cmt. 2. 
70 Id. at  § 81.02(a)(2). 
71 Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 905. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 904. 
74 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01. 
75 Id. at § 81.03(d). 
76 Id. at § 81.01. 
8
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To appoint a guardian, the court must consider less restrictive 
alternatives, such as employing visiting nurses, homemakers, home 
health aides, adult day care services, trusts, and representative and 
protective payees.77  In determining whether the appointment of a 
guardian is appropriate for the personal and property needs and safety 
of an AIP, a two-pronged test is applied.78  First, the court must de-
termine that an appointment is necessary to provide for the AIP’s 
needs.79  Second, if the AIP does not agree to the appointment of a 
guardian, the court must find that he or she is incapacitated.80  This 
includes reviewing available information such as the court evalua-
tor’s report.81 
Since Article 81 is flexible in order to conform to the needs of 
each individual, it closes the loophole for those who need some assis-
tance, but for whom a full-time guardian is not necessary.82  In these 
instances, the appointment of a temporary guardian is an option.83  
Temporary guardians are also appointed in emergency situations in-
volving suspected victimization or manipulation.84  In those situa-
tions, the temporary guardian has the power to put a hold on the 
AIP’s personal bank account and other assets until the court can fully 
review the matter.85 
C. Court Evaluator 
In collecting evidence, court evaluators are appointed to in-
vestigate the Article 81 petition and seek to insure that the AIP’s best 
interests are considered.86  The court can appoint a court evaluator 
 
77 Id. at § 81.03(d)-(e); see also Leslie Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental 
Illness-A Legal and Appropriate Alternative?, 4 ST. LOUIS U.J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 279 
(2011) (discussing acceptable alternatives to guardianship). 
78 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02. 
79 Id. at § 81.02(a)(1). 
80 Id. at § 81.02(a)(2). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at § 81.23(a)(1). 
83 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.23(a)(1). 
84 Id. at § 81.23; see In re Rochester Gen. Hosp., 601 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1993) (stating 
that a temporary guardian was appointed in order to complete the Medicaid application be-
cause the AIP’s son had failed to do so in a timely manner). 
85 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.23; see In re Ella C., 943 N.Y.S.2d 791 (Kings Cty. Sup. 
Ct. 2011) (stating that the court appointed “[a] temporary guardian of Ms C., restrained all of 
Ms C.'s children from interfering with her property rights, vacated any powers of attorney 
she had given, and restrained financial institutions from releasing Ms C.’s assets”). 
86 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(c)(4). 
9
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once an order to show cause is issued.87  The duties of the court eval-
uator are extensive, and are imperative in making sure that the AIP’s 
rights are protected.88
  
A court evaluator must meet with and inter-
view the AIP and explain, in whatever manner necessary, “the nature 
and possible consequences of the proceeding, the general powers and 
duties of a guardian, [and] available resources.”89 
The court evaluator must determine whether the AIP wants or 
needs legal counsel.90  The court evaluator must then compose a writ-
ten report and recommendation to the court.91  The report must be 
based on the court evaluator’s personal observations, and include re-
sponses to the seventeen questions listed in New York Mental Hy-
giene Law, Article 81.92  It is the court evaluator’s duty to attend all 
 
87 Id. at § 81.09(a). 
88 Id. at § 81.09(c). 
89 Id. at § 81.09(c)(1), (2). 
90 Id. at § 81.09(c)(2). 
91 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(c)(5). 
92 See Id. at § 81.09(c)(5) listing the following questions for assessment:  
(i) does the person . . . agree to the appointment; 
(ii) does the person wish legal counsel of his or her own choice; 
(iii) can the person . . . come to the courthouse for the hearing; 
(iv) . . . is the person completely unable to participate in the hearing; 
(v) if the person cannot come to the courthouse, would any meaningful 
participation result from the person’s presence at the hearing; 
(vi) are available resources sufficient and reliable to provide for personal 
needs or property management without the appointment of a guardian; 
(vii) how is the person . . . functioning; 
(viii) what is the person’s understanding and appreciation of the nature 
and consequences of any inability to manage the activities of daily liv-
ing; 
(ix) what is the approximate value and nature of the financial resources 
of the person; 
(x) what are the person’s preferences, wishes, and values with regard to 
managing the activities of daily living; 
(xi) has the person alleged to be incapacitated made any appointment or 
delegation; 
(xii) what would be the least restrictive form of intervention; 
(xiii) what assistance is necessary for those who are financially depend-
ent upon the person; 
(xiv) is the choice of proposed guardian appropriate; 
(xv) what potential conflicts of interest, if any, exist between or among 
family members and/or other interested parties regarding the proposed 
guardian or the proposed relief; 
(xvi) what potential conflicts of interest, if any, exist; and 
10
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court proceedings and conferences to adequately protect the AIP.93 
A court evaluator may be any person drawn from a pre-
approved list by the Office of Court Administration, including: 
the mental hygiene legal service in the judicial de-
partment where the person resides, a not-for-profit 
corporation, an attorney-at-law, physician, psycholo-
gist, accountant, social worker, or nurse, with 
knowledge of property management, personal care 
skills, problems associated with disabilities, and the 
private and public resources available for the type of 
limitation the person is alleged to have.94 
D. Counsel 
If an AIP has not acquired private counsel, the court must ap-
point Mental Hygiene Legal Services (MHLS) in the judicial depart-
ment where the AIP resides.95  MHLS is a New York State agency 
that advocates, and is responsible for, the rights of people who are 
admitted to all mental health, developmental disability, and drug-
treatment facilities.96  If MHLS is appointed as counsel, and the 
agency is already serving as court evaluator, MHLS will be relieved 
from its appointment as court evaluator.97 
E. Incapacity as the Standard 
To appoint a guardian without the AIP’s consent, the court 
must find that the AIP is incapacitated.98  The standard for incapacity 
focuses on the decision-making capabilities and functional limitations 
of the AIP.99  According to N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 81.12, the 
petitioner bears the burden and must demonstrate the quantum of 
 
(xvii) are there any additional persons who should be given notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. 
93
    Id. at § 81.09(c)(9). 
94 Id. at § 81.09(b)(1). 
95
   Id. at § 81.09(b)(2). 
96 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 47.01(a); see, e.g., In re Alexis H., 572 N.Y.S.2d 194,195 
(App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1991) (stating that MHLS provided legal assistance to patients and res-
idents of schools for mentally retarded and family care homes). 
97 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(b)(2). 
98 Id. at § 81.02(2)(A). 
99 Id. at § 81.02(c). 
11
Rosen: In Re Allers:  A Display Of Progress
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
230 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
proof required for a finding of incapacity.  The petitioner must prove 
incapacity by clear and convincing evidence.100  The petitioner must 
also provide evidence that the AIP is likely to suffer some sort of 
harm if the court does not intervene.101  These harms may be related 
to a person’s inability to provide for his or her own personal needs, or 
the management of his or her property.102  The court also looks at 
whether the AIP is likely to suffer harm because he or she is unable 
to comprehend the nature of his or her particular inability.103  To de-
termine incapacity, and the functional level and limitations of the 
person, the court also assesses the AIP’s management of daily living 
activities.104  Any and all physical and mental illnesses or prognoses 
are considered, as well as substance dependence and any medications 
that may affect the person’s behavior, cognition, or judgment.105 
Typically, guardians, court evaluators, and the various profes-
sionals who provide services to AIPs are chosen from a list that is 
preapproved by the court.106  However, there are circumstances in 
which the court will not refer to the list.107  Such circumstances exist 
when, among other instances, the proposed guardian is a relative of 
the AIP or is a nonprofit entity.108  Once a guardian is found to be 
necessary, the AIP must either agree to the appointment, or the court 
must find the person to be incapacitated.109  A hearing is required in 
either instance so that the court is able to assess the voluntariness of 
the AIP’s consent and make findings regarding the powers to be 
granted to the guardian.110 
F. Substituted Judgment 
Article 81 was enacted to provide narrowly tailored assistance 
to persons unable to adequately care for themselves and their proper-
 
100 Id. at § 81.12(a). 
101 Id. at § 81.02(b). 
102 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(b)(1). 
103 Id. at § 81.02(b)(2). 
104 Id. at § 81.02(c)(1). 
105 Id. at § 81.02(c)(4). 
106 Id. at § 81.09(b)(1). 
107 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 36.1(b) (2013). 
108 See Id. (listing banks and trust companies as other exceptions). 
109 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(a)(2). 
110 Id. at § 81.11(c). 
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ty.111  Often these limitations extend to an AIP’s inability to make 
reasoned judgments, warranting “the authorization and exercise of 
treatment powers by a guardian.”112  It is a legal standard of decision-
making on behalf of AIPs, in which the guardian must take into ac-
count the personal “wishes and desires of an incapacitated person,” 
while also using his better judgment for the health and well-being of 
the AIP.
 113  For example, an AIP suffering from schizophrenic delu-
sions may believe he is cured and no longer needs treatment, or that 
he is being medicated as part of some conspiracy.114  In such an in-
stance, where the AIP’s best interests are not compatible with his 
wishes, substituted judgment would be used.115  The common law 
doctrine of substituted judgment is recognized by the courts in New 
York,116 and “is an integral part of Article 81.”117 
A court can only allow the use of the doctrine of substituted 
judgment “if satisfied by clear and convincing evidence,” that it is 
necessary.118  Evidence must prove: 
that [t]he incapacitated person lacks the requisite men-
tal capacity to perform the act or acts for which ap-
proval has been sought[;] . . . [that] . . . a competent, 
reasonable individual in the position of the incapaci-
tated person would be likely to perform the act or acts 
under the same circumstances; [and that] [t]he inca-
pacitated person has not manifested an intention in-
consistent with the performance of the act or acts for 
which approval has been sought . . . or, if such inten-
tion was manifested, the particular person would be 
likely to have changed such intention under the cir-
cumstances existing at the time of the filing of the pe-
tition.119 
 
111 In re Conticchio, 696 N.Y.S.2d 769, 770-71 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. 1999); see also 
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(b)(1). 
112 Conticchio, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 771. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 In re Shah, 733 N.E.2d 1093, 1099-1100 (N.Y. 2000); see also In re Florence, 530 
N.Y.S.2d 981, 982 (Sur. Ct. 1988). 
117 Conticchio, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 771. 
118 Eugene E. Peckham, Last Resort Estate Planning Finds Acceptance in Statutes and 
Cases Relying on Substituted Judgment, 74 N.Y. ST. B.J. 33, 34 (2002). 
119 Id. (quoting N.Y.  MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21(e) (McKinney 2011)). 
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The substituted judgment provision of Article 81 ensures that the 
rights of AIPs are justly protected by “provid[ing] a method [of] last 
resort.”120 
V. PREVIOUS HOLDINGS 
In Allers, the court held that the authority cited by DSS was 
inapposite because it was based on standards articulated before the 
enactment of Article 81.121  The Fourth Department decision, In re 
Heckl,
122
 relied on In re Lyon, a Second Department case.123  In Lyon, 
the court applied the standard articulated in Articles 77 and 78 of the 
Mental Hygiene Law.
124
  Because the enactment of Article 81 height-
ened the required standard of proof, the court in Allers held it was not 
bound by stare decisis, and disagreed with Lyon.125 
A. In re Lyon 
In May of 1976, the Supreme Court of New York Appellate 
Division, Second Department, reviewed the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Westchester County, which appointed a third party as the 
guardian of AIP Lillian Lyon.126  The Appellant, the son of Mrs. 
Lyon, argued that he should have been appointed conservator.127  The 
“Appellant [was] the remainderman of [Mrs. Lyon’s] trust[,] which 
provide[d] income for the support of his mother” if other allocated 
funds were not sufficient.128  Contrary to the findings of the court, the 
Appellant claimed that his mother’s care was “‘squandering’ in view 
of her condition.”129 
Mrs. Lyon, an 84-year-old quadriplegic, resided in a nursing 
home, entirely dependent on others to care for her personal and prop-
erty needs.130  Both Mrs. Lyon’s in-house caretaker and chauffeur 
 
120 Peckham, supra note 118, at 38. 
121 Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 906. 
122 840 N.Y.S.2d 516 (4d Dep’t 2007). 
123 Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 906.; In re Lyon, 382 N.Y.S.2d 833 (2d Dep’t 1976). 
124 Lyon, 382 N.Y.S.2d. at 835. 
125 Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 906. 
126 Lyon, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 833 (explaining that at the time of the hearing the guardian was 
called the conservator and the AIP was called the conservatee). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
   129  Id. 
130 Id. 
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provided testimony explaining that prior to her deteriorated mental 
condition, Mrs. Lyon had expressed indifference about her son.131  A 
nurse at the residence also testified that the Appellant never sent his 
mother cards or did anything for her, and visited only twice in the 
year prior to the hearing.132  Applying Article 77, which was the stat-
ute then in force, and in view of the evidence provided, the court 
found no reason to disturb the arrangements; therefore, the petitioner, 
a friend of the AIP, remained the best choice as Mrs. Lyon’s conser-
vator.133 
B. In re Heckl 
In Heckl, Rosanna E. Heckl and her siblings sought to have 
their mother, Aida C., declared incapacitated in order to have a 
guardian appointed to watch over her property.134  The New York 
Supreme Court of Erie County appointed a court evaluator and or-
dered the evaluator to meet with the AIP in hopes of assisting and 
protecting her interests.135  The AIP then acquired counsel and moved 
to vacate the order.136  The AIP argued that being forced to discuss 
her personal business with a court evaluator violated her Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination because her responses 
could be introduced as evidence against her in her Guardianship Pro-
ceeding.137  Therefore, her “liberty interest [was] at stake.”138  The 
AIP argued that MHL § 81.10(g) allows an AIP to remove her court 
evaluator when the court appoints counsel.  Hence, this same rule 
should apply when the AIP hires her own counsel.139 
The court denied the AIP’s motion and ordered the court 
evaluator to meet with the AIP immediately, whereby the AIP con-
tinued to refuse to speak with the court evaluator.140  The court gave 
 
131 Lyons, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 834. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 835. 
134 Aida, C., 886 N.Y.S.2d at 296. 
135 Heckl, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 518-19. 
136 Id. at 518. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 519; see N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.10(g) (McKinney 2004) (stating that “the 
court may dispense with the appointment of a court evaluator or may vacate or suspend the 
appointment of a previously appointed court evaluator”). 
140 Heckl, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 522. 
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the AIP one last chance to comply with the instructions before being 
held in contempt.141  The AIP then appealed to the Appellate Divi-
sion, Fourth Department.142  This court held that “the appointment of 
a court evaluator did not violate the AIP’s constitutional rights.”143  
However, the court did “reverse[] the order of [] contempt” against 
the AIP.144  The appellate court agreed that the AIP’s liberty interest 
was at stake,145 but concluded instead that the constitutional protec-
tions “against self-incrimination do[] not attach in all instances,” such 
as administrative or civil proceedings.146  Because the AIP was not 
subject to any type of criminal proceeding, the constitutional protec-
tion against self-incrimination did not apply.147 
C. In re Gault 
The court in Heckl referred to In re Gault,148 a United States 
Supreme Court decision, “which [discussed the degree] to which the 
U.S. Constitution protects the right against self-incrimination.”149  In 
Gault, a minor was taken into police custody because he and another 
boy had allegedly made lewd phone calls to a neighbor.150  Accom-
panied by his mother and older brother, the minor met with the judge 
in his chambers to discuss the accusations.151  Neither he nor his ac-
companying family members were informed that the minor did not 
have to make any statements.152  At the hearing, the judge provided 
testimony concerning the minor’s undocumented statements from the 
meeting.153 
The judge determined that the minor was a delinquent and 
committed him to a specialized school until he reached the age of ma-
jority.154  The minor’s counsel filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing 
 
141 Id. 
142 Prisco, supra note 11, at 1327. 
143 Id. at 1330. 
144 Id. at 1330-31. 
145 Heckl, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 520. 
146 Id. at 520 (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 372 (1986)). 
147 Heckl, 840 N.Y.S.2d at 520. 
148 Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
149 Prisco, supra note 11, at 1331. 
150 Gault, 387 U.S. at 4. 
151 Id. at 5. 
152 Id. at 10. 
153 Id. at 7. 
154 Id. (stating that the age of majority is twenty-one). 
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that he was not afforded the constitutional protections against self-
incrimination that he otherwise deserved.155  The State argued that the 
Fifth Amendment provided those protections only in instances related 
to criminal matters and that juvenile proceedings were civil.156  
“[The] Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, and the United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.”157 
The United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amend-
ment could not be limited to a specific class of individuals or merely 
to criminal proceedings.158  Instead, one must look to the “nature of 
the statement of admission and the exposure which it invites.”159  The 
Court held that even when a proceeding is non-criminal, the privilege 
against self-incrimination might still be invoked.160  Here, the Fifth 
Amendment protection against self-incrimination was interpreted and 
applied broadly.161 
D. Allen v. Illinois 
Allen v. Illinois significantly limited the scope and application 
of the Fifth Amendment.162  The defendant in Allen was prosecuted 
by the State of Illinois for “committing [] crimes of unlawful restraint 
and deviate sexual assault.”163  The State attempted to have the de-
fendant “declared a sexually dangerous person” and committed to a 
psychiatric institution.164  As part of this process, the defendant had to 
undergo a number of psychiatric examinations.165  Later, the defend-
ant objected to the introduction of statements he made to the psychia-
trists, claiming that his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination was violated.166  The trial judge advised the State to 
 
155 Gault, 387 U.S. at 42. 
156 Id. at 46. 
157 Prisco, supra note 11, at 1333. 
158 Gault, 387 U.S. at 49. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 59. 
162 Allen, 478 U.S. at 375. 
163 Id. at 365; see People v. Allen, 463 N.E.2d 135, 136 (Ill. 1984) (stating that the de-
fendant was charged with unlawful restraint and deviate sexual assault “pursuant to Sections 
11-3 and 10-3 of the Illinois Criminal Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, Ch. 38, Pars. 11-3 and 10-
3)”). 
164 Allen, 478 U.S. at 365. 
165 Id. at 366. 
166 Id. 
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limit its testimony to include only the opinions of the examining psy-
chiatrists.167 
The court found the defendant “to be a sexually dangerous 
person” and committed him to a mental health facility.168  The Appel-
late Court of Illinois for the Third District reversed, finding that the 
defendant’s constitutional rights, outlined in the Fifth Amendment, 
were not protected.169  The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed, find-
ing that the defendant’s right against self-incrimination did not apply 
in a civil proceeding concerning psychiatric treatment.170  The United 
States Supreme Court affirmed, stating that the proceedings “were 
not ‘criminal’ within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.”171  The Court stated that the precedent 
set in Gault, declaring that the protections of the Fifth Amendment 
are invoked whenever one’s liberty interests are at stake, is “plainly 
not good law,” and that the Fifth Amendment was not applicable.172 
VI. THE HOLDING IN ALLERS 
The court in Allers, held that United Health Services Hospi-
tals was the most applicable and appropriate case on point.173  In 
United Health Services, the AIP was called to the stand to testify 
about his condition at his own Guardianship Proceeding.174  The 
AIP’s counsel objected on the grounds that the AIP’s liberty interests 
were at stake, claiming he could not be forced to testify according to 
the United States and New York Constitutions.175  The New York 
Supreme Court of Broome County had to determine whether an AIP 
could be compelled to answer questions where the answers could di-
rectly affect the AIP’s liberty interest.176 
The court felt that the deprivation of liberty faced by the mi-
nor in Gault was comparable to the liberties at stake in United Health 
 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 366. 
169 Allen, 478 U.S. at 367 (relying on Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)). 
170 Id. at 367 (relying on Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). 
171 Id. at 375. 
172 Id. at 372. 
173 Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 905 (citing United Health Servs. Hosps. Inc., 785 N.Y.S.2d 
313). 
174 United Health Servs. Hosps. Inc., 785 N.Y.S.2d at 313. 
175 Id. at 316-17. 
176 Id. at 313. 
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Services Hospital, Inc. in that both were subject to potential civil 
commitment against their will, and the livelihood of the minors in 
were dependent upon decisions made by others.177  The court in Unit-
ed Health Services addressed the holding in Gault, which stated that 
“there is a threat of self-incrimination whenever there is a ‘depriva-
tion of liberty’; [sic] and there is such a deprivation whatever the 
name of the institution, if a person is held against his will.”178  Based 
on this reasoning and because of the loss of liberty at stake, the court 
found that the AIP could not be forced to testify at a Guardianship 
Proceeding because doing so would be a denial of his or her constitu-
tional protections against self-incrimination.179 
VII. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE, WHAT WE SHOULD DO, AND 
WHAT IT ALL MEANS FOR THE FUTURE 
Guardianship is going to become even more important in our 
society in the coming years.180  It is a powerful legal instrument that 
can bring about positive or negative effects upon a vulnerable popula-
tion with impairments, “affording needed protections, yet drastically 
reducing fundamental rights.”181  Demographic trends show that there 
will be an “increased need for surrogate decision-making,” and there-
fore, a greater calling for the guardianship system as a whole.182  This 
need will continue to climb as the population ages.183  Moreover, ad-
vances in medical technology have enabled human beings to live 
longer and potentially outlive caregivers, necessitating more frequent 
guardianship appointment.184  Additionally, the issues associated with 
the guardianship system impact all parts of society.185  Individuals of 
all social strata186 and ages with mental retardation, developmental 
disabilities, and mental illnesses comprise growing populations who 
utilize the guardianship system.187  For these reasons, the guardian-
 
177 Id. at 316-17. 
178 Id. at 314. 
179 United Health Servs. Hosps. Inc., 785 N.Y.S.2d at 317. 
180 Karp & Wood, supra note 3, at 149. 
181 Id. at 146. 
182 Id. at 149-50. 
183 Id. at 149. 
184 Id. at 149-50. 
185 Laura Lane, Justice for the Weakest, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 26, 2006. 
186 Id. 
187 Karp & Wood, supra note 3, at 150. 
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ship system will be used more frequently, and therefore, must be 
monitored closely to protect this vulnerable and ever-growing popu-
lation.188 
AIPs and individuals involved in guardianship appointments 
can be described as the “ ‘unbefriended’ population, that is, those 
who have no family or friends available and qualified to serve as 
guardian.”189  Guardians make a variety of critical care decisions, of-
ten with little knowledge of an AIP’s personal life or values, “some-
times with high [workloads] and insufficient staffing.”190  Elder abuse 
inflicted by such caretakers has been the cause of harm accounting 
for injury, exploitation, and mistreatment of between one and two 
million Americans ages sixty-five and older.191  Oftentimes the 
friendship a person forms “can initially appear innocent,” such as 
where the AIP signs his house over to his guardian because he is 
grateful to have someone caring for him, acting like a friend.192  
However, these situations often result in the financial abuse of 
AIPs.193 
It is not far-fetched to expect the Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination extends further than to merely protect crim-
inal defendants194 because an AIP who has legally been categorized 
as incompetent is far more vulnerable and susceptible to being taken 
advantage of than a criminal defendant.195  This population is at an 
even greater risk than criminal defendants, who have been provided 
this protection, as Guardianship Proceedings may determine who will 
be making medical and personal care decisions, such as, where an 
AIP will reside, including the power to place the AIP in a nursing 
home or residential care facility, and how their assets will be han-
dled.196  The current guardianship system continues to be “complex, 
fractured, insensitive, and uncaring to the needs of a very vulnerable 
 
188 Id. at 184 (stating that “monitoring is at the very core of the court’s . . . responsibil-
ity.”). 
189 Id. at 150. 
190 Id. at 151. 
191 Id. at 150. 
192 Lane, supra note 185. 
193 Id. 
194 See Allen, 478 U.S. at 375 (holding that a criminal defendant is entitled to the right 
against self-incrimination). 
195 Karp & Wood, supra note 3, at 184 (referring to AIPs as society’s “most vulnerable” 
members). 
196 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.22(a)(1-9) (McKinney 2010). 
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population.”197 
A.  What Has Been Done Thus Far? 
In the past, “the impetus for [] change” in the guardianship 
system came more from the press than from legal professionals.198  
Prior to the formation of Article 81, the Associated Press put together 
“an exposé of adult guardianship that caused a[n] [uproar nation-
wide], [] prompt[ing] Congressional hearings.”199  In response, an in-
terdisciplinary conference took place where “national experts in law, 
psychiatry and psychology, advocates, court administrators, and 
judges” gathered.200  The conference generated the eponymous “ 
‘Wingspread Recommendations’, which were subsequently adopted 
by the ABA House of Delegates.”201  In addition, a growing number 
of not-for-profit and for-profit agencies, as well as public guardian-
ship programs, developed to serve this at-risk, “unbefriended” popu-
lation.202  Because of these and other efforts in the 1980’s, there was 
a burst of guardianship reform.203 
New York’s Mental Hygiene Law, Article 81 exemplifies 
“the current paradigm in guardianship,” acknowledging the challeng-
es set forth by earlier activists.204  In the past, many New York courts 
have used a narrow interpretation of the Fifth Amendment as applied 
to AIPs, focusing less on the rights at stake and more on the cause of 
action or type of proceeding at hand.205  More recently, though, as 
seen in Allers, the privilege has been applied more broadly to non-
criminal proceedings.206 
“Article 81 ushered in a new era in the treatment of mental 
 
197 Lane, supra note 185. 
198 Kristin Booth Glen, Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal Capacity, Guardi-
anship, and Beyond, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 108 (2012). 
199 Id. at 109. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Karp & Wood, supra note 3, at 150. 
203 Glen, supra note 198, at 109; see A. Frank Johns, Ten Years After: Where is the Con-
stitutional Crisis with Procedural Safeguards and Due Process in Guardianship Adjudica-
tion?, 7 ELDER L.J. 33, 78-79 (1999) (stating that “twenty-eight states introduced as many as 
100 guardianship bills, passing as many as twenty-three in eighteen states.”). 
204 Glen, supra note 198, at 111. 
205 Heckl, 886 N.Y.S.2d at 298. 
206 Allers, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 906. 
21
Rosen: In Re Allers:  A Display Of Progress
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
240 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
illness,” providing for the least restrictive form of intervention. 207  
The new, stricter Article 81 protects an AIP’s Fifth Amendment right 
to a greater extent than ever before.208  Therefore, reliance on cases 
decided prior to the enactment of Article 81 is incorrect, and the 
holding in Allers should be utilized instead.  This process is what has 
caused AIPs to question the application of the Fifth Amendment, as 
the new standard has dealt with this issue inconsistently.  Article 81 
should act as an example of what guardianship statutes nationwide 
should strive to mimic because it represents a profound step away 
from a model of traditional litigation.  Decisions prior to Article 81 
show the arc of progress leading up to and following its implementa-
tion, but should not be relied on as precedent because the standard 
has changed. 
B. What Should We Do? 
As proven by the effects of the Human Rights Movement of 
the 1980’s, the people need to expect and demand incremental 
change toward protection for AIPs in a more consistent manner.  In 
essence, involvement of the press is crucial.  Aside from the efforts 
put forth thus far and the decision in Allers, lower courts in New 
York continue to act inconsistently regarding the application of the 
Fifth Amendment to Guardianship Proceedings.209  Still unclear is 
whether the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies 
to Guardianship Proceedings in whole, or only in particular circum-
stances.  Although the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination was applied to an AIP taking the stand as a witness in 
Allers, this privilege was not applied to statements made by an AIP to 
a court evaluator in Heckl.210 
In order to keep guardianship law moving, the Fifth Amend-
ment must be consistently and permanently added as a safeguard to 
all aspects of the guardianship system.  Heckl needs to be reversed 
because it highlights a major inconsistency that still exists and exem-
plifies how Article 81 was not an all-encompassing fix.  Even in an 
instance such as Heckl, where the improved Article 81 was applied, 
 
207 Peckman, supra note 118, at 34. 
208 Id. 
209 Prisco, supra note 11, at 1340. 
210 Id. at 1343. 
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the AIP was not protected by the right against self-incrimination.211  
The AIP’s worries were rational and she did not want to speak to a 
court evaluator because she knew everything she said could be used 
against her at a hearing as though she had taken the stand.  Thus, the 
AIP was faced with a predicament, having to choose between testify-
ing or facing contempt of the court.212  The Fifth Amendment should 
be applied, not only to protect an AIP against self-incrimination, but 
also to conversations between the AIP and the appointed court evalu-
ator, especially when the AIP is able to provide their own counsel. 
Unfortunately, judges are forced to rely on historical prece-
dent that argues that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination should not be applied in a civil proceeding.213  Howev-
er, the scope of the Fifth Amendment has broadened, and such an ap-
plication is no longer warranted.  Gault demonstrates that the United 
States Supreme Court is in agreement that the scope of the Fifth 
Amendment has broadened and that it should not only be applied to 
specific populations.214  Judges need to adhere consistently to this 
broadened interpretation, applying the right against self-incrimination 
to all aspects of Guardianship Proceedings. 
The decision in United Health Services has left an imprint on 
the New York court system because it was the first of its kind draw-
ing on the conclusions made in Gault.215  This court also supported 
the notion that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 
should not be narrowly applied.  One can only hope that these deci-
sions will act as an example for future issues related to the Fifth 
Amendment and Guardianship Law in general. 
C. Proposed Model 
The holdings in Allers and United Health Services do not do a 
great deal to “quell the concerns of AIPs.”216  Although the imple-
mentation of Article 81 was a huge stride forward, there is still room 
to strengthen its protections.  Article 81 continues to be “described as 
 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 1330. 
213 Johns, supra note 203, at 66. 
214 Prisco, supra note 11, at 1337. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 1343. 
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a statute at war with itself.”217  While some decisions suggest that 
Guardianship Proceedings should be treated as “traditional litigation” 
based upon the technicalities of the law, others treat Article 81 mere-
ly as a guideline to meet the “best interest[s]” of the AIP.218  There is 
still, however, a middle ground between these two extremes.  In fact, 
a more holistic approach may be the answer.219  AIPs deserve the 
heightened standard of scrutiny introduced by Article 81, as well as 
greater sensitivity in general.  The system must look beyond the legal 
paperwork and see the person. 
Guardianship Proceedings deserve to be subjected to the 
heightened standard of scrutiny introduced by Article 81, not only 
because the individual’s liberty interest is at stake, but also because 
decisions rely heavily on the discretion of a single judge220 determin-
ing mental capacity on a case-by-case basis.221  Historically, judges 
appointed to Guardianship Proceedings have often “lack[ed] the req-
uisite expertise,” having little or no training in mental health law or 
psychiatry.222  It is not recommended that this discretion be taken 
away from judges, but rather, that judges appointed to handle Guardi-
anship Proceedings have an actual interest in the sensitive matters at 
hand.  Guardianship judges deal with particularly personal matters, 
and have the ability to change an individual’s liberties.  A judge with 
a greater interest will likely treat these proceedings with greater sen-
sitivity and attention. 
A society can be judged by the way it “treats its weakest and 
most vulnerable members.”223  For this reason, Guardianship Pro-
ceedings should not be treated as traditional litigation.  There should 
not be a strict adherence to the rules of evidence because the best in-
terests of the AIP should be a priority.  In fact, this is the goal those 
who advocated for the implementation of Article 81 sought to 
achieve.224  A special problem-solving courtroom with a less intimi-
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dating environment may be more conducive to this result.  AIPs, who 
often enter Guardianship Proceedings frightened and disoriented, 
should never feel like they have done wrong; a guardianship court-
room should feel very little like a courtroom.  Greater efforts must be 
made to assure that AIPs are not frightened by the system or the 
courtroom.  In this regard, round-table discussions, rather than tradi-
tional court hearings, may provide a more conducive environment. 
Integrating all pending cases involving an incapacitated per-
son before a single judge may actually prove to be beneficial for the 
mental well-being of an AIP who would no longer have to go from 
courtroom to courtroom.225  Traditional guardianship caseloads are 
six cases a day, five days a week.226  To provide greater sensitivity to 
this population, caseloads should be lessened.  By lessening each 
judge’s caseload and appointing judiciary duties to judges who have 
an interest in the issues associated with guardianship, judges will not 
only be able to spend more time on individual matters, they will also 
have a better chance of knowing the family and the circumstances, 
“and can effectively work with the different parties to get things re-
solved” in the best interests of the AIP.227 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The courts need to consistently apply the Fifth Amendment to 
Guardianship Proceedings using a more holistic approach, while 
striving for a happy medium between a strict application of the tradi-
tional rules of evidence and the guidelines provided by Article 81.  
Although the law pertaining to Guardianship Proceedings has come a 
long way toward protecting not only the property, but also the per-
sonal interests of AIPs, the current system continues to be one “in 
which decisions are unpredictable and [] inconsistent.”228 
The right against self-incrimination was created to maintain 
the integrity of the courts by preventing the use of coerced statements 
created by abhorrent methods such as force or psychological domina-
tion.229  These intentions, paired with the vulnerability of the popula-
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tion utilizing the guardianship system, make AIPs most in need of 
Fifth Amendment protections.  Yet, historically, this right has been 
applied far too narrowly.  Until recently, the protection against self-
incrimination excluded AIPs in Guardianship Proceedings, and even 
today, this issue continues to be addressed inconsistently.  It would 
be surprising and totally illogical if the privilege against self-
incrimination were available to hardened criminals, but not to AIPs. 
In Allers, the court was not willing to apply stare decisis from 
previous cases, which repealed former Articles 77 and 78, showing 
that the enactment of Article 81 was an acknowledgement of the dire 
need to heighten the protection of AIPs’ rights and to administer a 
gentler approach instead.230  Allers displays a legislative distinction of 
the improved standard.  This heightened sensitivity applies not only 
to constitutional rights, but also to the approach of the courts.  Aside 
from this most recent decision favoring the protection of AIPs, 
Guardianship Proceedings in New York and nationwide still fail to 
incorporate the kindness and sensitivity needed for this population.  
Demographic trends underscore the dire need for the application of 
the Fifth Amendment in Guardianship Proceedings when constitu-
tional rights and financial resources are transferred to guardians, leav-
ing AIPs with diminished capacity at the mercy of the guardians. 
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